SALT agreements signed

SALT agreements signed



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Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Richard Nixon, meeting in Moscow, sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements. At the time, these agreements were the most far-reaching attempts to control nuclear weapons ever.

Nixon and Brezhnev seemed unlikely candidates for the American and Soviet statesmen who would sign a groundbreaking arms limitation treaty. Both men carried reputations as hard-line Cold War warriors. Yet, by 1972, both leaders were eager for closer diplomatic relations between their respective nations. The Soviet Union was engaged in an increasingly hostile war of words with communist China; border disputes between the two nations had erupted in the past few years. The United States was looking for help in extricating itself from the unpopular and costly war in Vietnam. Nixon, in particular, wished to take the American public’s mind off the fact that during nearly four years as president, he had failed to bring an end to the conflict. The May 1972 summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev was an opportune moment to pursue the closer relations each desired.

The most important element of the summit concerned the SALT agreements. Discussions on SALT had been occurring for about two-and-a-half years, but with little progress. During the May 1972 meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev, however, a monumental breakthrough was achieved. The SALT agreements signed on May 27 addressed two major issues. First, they limited the number of antiballistic missile (ABM) sites each country could have to two. (ABMs were missiles designed to destroy incoming missiles.) Second, the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles was frozen at existing levels. There was nothing in the agreements, however, about multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle missiles (single missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads) or about the development of new weapons. Nevertheless, most Americans and Soviets hailed the SALT agreements as tremendous achievements.

In August 1972, the U.S. Senate approved the agreements by an overwhelming vote. SALT-I, as it came to be known, was the foundation for all arms limitations talks that followed.

READ MORE: Détente: Definition, Policy & Cold War


Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)

The earliest efforts to halt the growth in strategic arms launched on a multilateral level and using comprehensive schemes ended in failure. In January 1964, at the Geneva-based Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the United States proposed a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of the US and Soviet strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, which would be negotiated on a bilateral level. The Soviet Union did not accept this proposal due to the US superiority in the number of weapons at that time. When in 1966 and 1967 the United States proposed that both sides forgo deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses, the Soviet Union offered to include strategic offensive weapons in the discussion of strategic defensive weapons. This proposal was accepted by the United States, and on 1 July 1968, at the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), President Johnson announced that the United States and the USSR had reached an agreement to negotiate limitations and reductions of both strategic offensive and defensive systems.

For some time, due to external and internal reasons, the sides were not able to begin substantive discussions on the subject. Finally, on 20 January 1969, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to discuss strategic arms limitations. On 17 November 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) on limiting both ABM defensive systems and strategic nuclear offensive systems. The first real exploration of possible packages began in the spring of 1970. At one point, the sides reached an impasse because of a disagreement on what types of strategic weapons should be included in the treaty. The USSR insisted that the US forward based systems (FBS) were counted in the strategic equation, while the United States believed that FBS and the relevant Soviet short-medium-and intermediate-range strategic systems should be dealt with in a different forum. The second deadlock was caused by disagreement on the scope of the future treaty: the Soviet Union proposed that the negotiations should be limited to discussions of ABM systems only, while the United States insisted that it was essential to make at least a beginning at limiting offensive systems as well. On 20 May 1971, the impasse was broken, when the United States and USSR announced that they had reached a preliminary agreement on a partial constraint on certain strategic offensive systems and on a treaty to limit ABM systems.

After three years of negotiations, during a summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev, on 26 May 1972, the talks were concluded with the signing of two basic SALT I documents:

  • an Interim Agreement on certain measures limiting strategic offensive arms and
  • the ABM Treaty on the limitation of strategic defensive systems.

It was the first agreement between the United States and the USSR that placed limits and restraints on their nuclear weapons systems.

Obligations

The Parties undertook not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after 1 July 1972 (Article I) Agreed Statement A specified that fixed land-based ABM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Agreement might be completed. The Agreement obligated the Parties not to convert land-based launchers of older types or light ICBMs into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after 1964 (Article II). The Agreement also limited the numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and modern ballistic missile submarines to those operational and under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement (Article III).

The Protocol to the Agreement with regard to Article III, entitled the United States to have no more than 710 SLBM launchers on 44 modern ballistic missile submarines, and the USSR, no more than 950 SLBM launchers on 62 submarines. Additional SLBM launchers in excess of the initial level of 656 for the United States and 740 for the USSR up to the above-agreed levels may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ICBM launchers of old types deployed prior to 1964 or of SLBM launchers on older submarines.

Subject to the provisions of the Agreement, the Parties received the right to conduct modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by the Agreement (Article IV). In Agreed Statement C, the Parties expressed understanding that in the process of modernization and replacement, the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers would not be significantly increased. The Parties further expressed a common understanding that the term "significantly increased" means that an increase would not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers. The Parties also agreed that there would be no significant increase in the number of ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, and that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges would be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training (Agreed Statement D).

To promote the objectives and implementation of the Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) established under the 1972 ABM Treaty (Article VI). The Agreement obligated the Parties to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms, whose scope or terms would not be prejudiced by the obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement (Article VII). The Parties agreed that they would observe the obligations of the Agreement and would not take any action prohibited by the Agreement, as well as the ABM Treaty, pending their ratification or acceptance.

Verification and Compliance

Verification

The Agreement entitled the Parties to use their national technical means (NTM) of verification to ensure compliance with the Agreement and obligated them not to interfere with NTM of the other Party, nor to use deliberate concealment measures that may impede verification by NTM (Article V).

Compliance

No mechanisms existed to deal with non-compliance.

Withdrawal

The Agreement entitled the Parties to withdraw from the Agreement with a six-month advanced notice if they decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Agreement have jeopardized their supreme interests. In its Unilateral Statement A, the United States noted that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations was not achieved within five years, the US supreme interests could be jeopardized and it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

In its Unilateral Statement B, the United States stated that it would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the effectiveness of the Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Soviet Unilateral Statement stressed that should NATO allies of the United States increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the number of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the USSR would have the right to a similar increase in the number of its submarines. In response to this Statement, the United States declared that it did not accept its validity.


From SALT to START: A Timeline of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Talks

Since the 1960s, the U.S. and Russia have prioritized bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control. Even in times of conflict and tension, the two countries have known that cooperating on security and nuclear risk reduction is a life-or-death matter. However, this history of arms control diplomacy has recently come under threat.

Check out this timeline of U.S.-Russian arms control talks and treaties that have taken place since 1969, and why it is important to continue cooperation on further nuclear reductions following the extension of New START:

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I: Signed in 1972
Status: Superseded by SALT II U.S. withdrew from ABM Treaty in 2002
SALT negotiations started in 1969 and culminated in 1972 with the signing of two documents: an Interim Agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It was the first agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that placed limits on their nuclear weapons arsenals.

The Interim Agreement capped U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces, and both sides agreed not to construct new ICBM silos and not to “significantly” increase the size of existing ICBM silos. SALT I was an interim agreement because the parties pledged to continue negotiations. The month before the agreement was due to expire, both the U.S. and Soviet Union stated that they would continue to honor the agreement while SALT II was being negotiated.

The ABM Treaty barred the two countries from deploying defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. In June 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the treaty, eventually deploying systems in Europe and spurring Russian modernization of its nuclear capabilities. Missile defense has become an obstacle to further progress on arms control negotiations.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II: Signed in 1979
Status: Never entered into force Expired in 1985 Followed by START I in 1991
SALT II talks took place from 1972 to 1979. The overarching goal of these talks was to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive, long-lasting treaty. The provisions of SALT II included banning new missile programs and limiting the number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and long-range missiles to 1,320.

Although SALT II resulted in an agreement in 1979, the U.S. Senate did not ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The Soviet legislature also did not ratify it. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985 and was not renewed.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Signed in 1987
Status: U.S. withdrew in 2019
After years of on and off negotiations, the INF Treaty was signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987. The treaty required the two countries to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. It was the first treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons and marked the first time the two superpowers agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In total, 2,692 missiles were eliminated.

The treaty led directly to another landmark treaty, the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The U.S. formally suspended the INF Treaty in February 2019, and Russia did so on the following day in response. The U.S. formally withdrew from the treaty in August 2019.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I: Signed in 1991
Status: Expired in 2009 Followed by New START
The signing of the INF Treaty accelerated talks for START I, which was signed in July 1991 and entered into force in December 1994. The treaty prevented the two countries from deploying more than 6,000 warheads on top of 1,600 ICBMs and bombers. START I was a large and complex treaty, and led to reducing about 80 percent of strategic nuclear weapons at that time. Another important aspect of START I was its verification and transparency provisions, such as data exchange on strategic weapons and facilities and inspections.

START I expired in December 2009.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II: Signed in 1993
Status: Never entered into force
START II was meant to complement, rather than replace, START I. START II established a limit on strategic weapons, with reductions to be implemented in two phases. By the end of Phase I, the U.S. and Russia were to reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250, and by the end of Phase II, to 3,000-3,500. Phase II also required the elimination of all heavy ICBMs and all ICBMs on MIRVs.

However, the treaty never entered into effect. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996 and by Russia in April 2000. Russia withdrew from the treaty in June 2002 in response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT): Signed in 2002
Status: Superseded by New START
Signed in May 2002, SORT was in force from June 2003 until February 2011 when it was superseded by New START. Whereas START I limited warheads through their delivery systems, SORT limited operationally deployed warheads. Under SORT, both parties agreed to limit their nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads each. It did not contain any verification measures. Instead, the U.S. and Russia agreed to rely on START I measures to ensure compliance.

After ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Russian State Duma, SORT came into force in June 2003. It would have expired on December 31, 2012 if not superseded by New START.

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START): Signed in 2009
Status: Still in effect, extended by the U.S. and Russia for five years in Jan 2021
In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed New START, a follow-up to START I which expired in December 2009. New START limits the two parties to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and deployed nuclear-capable bombers and 800 total (deployed and nondeployed) launchers. It also provides for the inspections and data sharing on each other’s nuclear arsenals that had been lost when START I expired in 2009.

New START is working, and it’s imperative that Russia and the United States start negotiations for a follow-on agreement that continues decades of cooperation on nuclear arms reductions.


U.S. Department of State

Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979

In accordance with Article VII of the Interim Agreement, in which the sides committed themselves to continue active negotiations on strategic offensive arms, the SALT II negotiations began in November 1972. The primary goal of SALT II was to replace the Interim Agreement with a long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. The principal U.S. objectives as the SALT II negotiations began were to provide for equal numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides, to begin the process of reduction of these delivery vehicles, and to impose restraints on qualitative developments which could threaten future stability.

Early discussion between the sides focused on the weapon systems to be included, factors involved in providing for equality in numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, taking into account the important differences between the forces of the two sides, bans on new systems, qualitative limits, and a Soviet proposal to include U.S. forward-based systems. The positions of the sides differed widely on many of these issues.

A major breakthrough occurred at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974, between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. At this meeting, the sides agreed to a basic framework for the SALT II agreement. Basic elements of the Aide-Memoire, which recorded this agreement, included:

-- 1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems

-- ban on construction of new land-based ICBM launchers

-- limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and

-- important elements of the Interim Agreement (e.g., relating to verification) would be incorporated in the new agreement.

    -- 2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) of the sides

In addition, the Aide-Memoire stated that the duration of the new agreement would be through 1985.

In early 1975, the delegations in Geneva resumed negotiations, working toward an agreement based on this general framework. It was during this time that a Joint Draft Text was first prepared and many limitations were agreed. During the negotiations, however, it became clear that there was fundamental disagreement between the two sides on two major issues: how cruise missiles were to be addressed, and whether the new Soviet bomber known to the United States as Backfire would be considered a heavy bomber and therefore counted in the 2,400 aggregate. While there was disagreement on other issues such as MIRV verification provisions, restrictions on new systems, and missile throw-weight ceilings, progress was made in these areas. However, the issues of cruise missiles and Backfire remained unresolved.

When the new Administration took office in 1977, renewed emphasis was placed on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A comprehensive interagency review of SALT was undertaken. Building on the work of the previous Administra-tion, particularly the Vladivostok accord and the subsequent agreement on many issues in Geneva, the United States made a comprehen-sive proposal which was presented to the Soviets by Secretary of State Vance in March 1977. This proposal would have added significant reductions and qualitative constraints to the ceilings which were agreed to at Vladivostok. At the same time, the United States also presented an alternative proposal for a SALT II agreement similar to the framework agreed to at Vladivostok, with the Backfire and cruise missile issues deferred until SALT III.

Both proposals were rejected by the Soviets as inconsistent with their understandings of the Vladivostok accord.

In subsequent negotiations, the sides agreed on a general framework for SALT II which accommodated both the Soviet desire to retain the Vladivostok framework for an agreement, and the U.S. desire for more comprehensive limitations in SALT II.

The agreement would consist of three parts:

-- A Protocol of about three-years duration which would cover certain issues such as cruise missile constraints, mobile ICBM limits, and qualitative constraints on ICBMs, while deferring further negotiations on these issues to SALT III

-- A Joint Statement of Principles which would be an agreed set of guidelines for future negotiations.

Within this framework, negotiations to resolve the remaining differences continued on several levels. President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Washington in September 1977. Further high-level meetings were held in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva during 1978 and 1979. In addition, the SALT delegations of the United States and Soviet Union in Geneva were in session nearly continuously following the 1974 Vladivostok meeting to work out agreed Treaty language on those issues where agreement in principle had been reached at the ministerial level.

The completed SALT II agreement was signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. President Carter transmitted it to the Senate on June 22 for its advice and consent to ratification.

On January 3, 1980, however, President Carter requested the Senate majority leader to delay consideration of the Treaty on the Senate floor in view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the Treaty remained unratified, each Party was individually bound under the terms of international law to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, until it had made its intentions clear not to become a party to the Treaty.

In 1980, President Carter announced the United States would comply with the provisions of the Treaty as long as the Soviet Union reciprocated. Brezhnev made a similar statement regarding Soviet intentions.

In May 1982, President Reagan stated he would do nothing to undercut the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union showed equal restraint. The Soviet Union again agreed to abide by the unratified Treaty.

Subsequently, in 1984 and 1985, President Reagan declared that the Soviet Union had violated its political commitment to observe the SALT II Treaty. President Reagan decided, however, that an interim framework of mutual restraint remained in the U.S. interest and, in June 1985, declared that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva.

On May 26, 1986, President Reagan stated that he had reviewed again the status of U.S. interim restraint policy and that, as he had documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, the Soviet Union had not complied with its political commitment to observe the SALT agreements, including the SALT II Treaty, nor had the Soviet Union indicated its readiness to join in a framework of truly mutual restraint. He declared that, "Given this situation, . in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure. " In his statement, President Reagan said that he did not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces and that, assuming no significant change in the threat, the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviets. The United States would, in sum, ". continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides." He again called upon the Soviet Union to join the United States ". in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint."

The SALT II Treaty would have provided for:

-- an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles

-- an equal aggregate limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and

-- an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

    -- an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been 2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981

In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement would have included:

-- a ban on heavy mobile ICBM launchers, and on launchers of heavy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs)

-- a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side

-- a ban on increasing the numbers of warheads on existing types of ICBMs, and a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted to each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber would have been limited to an average of 28 and the number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber of existing types would have been limited to 20

-- ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs

-- a ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM

-- a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems

-- a ban on certain new types of strategic offensive systems which were technologically feasible, but which had not yet been deployed. Such systems included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the seabeds

-- advance notification of certain ICBM test launches and

-- an agreed data base for systems included in various SALT-limited categories.

    -- a ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, and on increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers

The Treaty also included detailed definitions of limited systems, provisions to enhance verification, a ban on circumvention of the provisions of the agreement, and a provision outlining the duties of the SCC in connection with the SALT II Treaty. The duration of the Treaty was to have been through 1985.

Verification of the SALT II Treaty would have been by national technical means (NTM) of verification, including photo-reconnaissance satellites. The sides had agreed not to interfere with each others national technical means of verification, and not to use deliberate concealment measures which would have impeded verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Because specific characteristics of some SALT-limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring of testing programs was an important aspect of SALT verification. Such monitoring might have involved collection of electronic signals known as telemetry which are used during tests to transmit information about systems while they are being tested. Therefore, the sides had agreed not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information such as through the use of telemetry encryption whenever such denial would have impeded verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

In addition to these provisions of the Treaty which directly addressed the question of verification, counting and distinguishability rules, as well as some constraints on specific systems, were incorporated into the agreement specifically for verification purposes.

To facilitate verification of the MIRV limits, the sides agreed that once a missile had been tested with MIRVs, then all missiles of that type were to be considered to have been equipped with MIRVs, even if that missile type had also been tested with a non-MIRV payload. Additionally, the sides agreed that once a launcher contained or launched a MIRVed missile, then all launchers of that type would be considered to be launchers of MIRVed missiles and included in the 1,320 limit. Similar counting rules were adopted for cruise missiles and for heavy bombers.

A constraint included for verification purposes was a ban on production, testing, and deployment of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM. The missile appeared to share a number of components with the Soviet SS-20, an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). As the Parties had agreed that land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs should not be converted into launchers of ICBMs, the United States sought this ban on the SS-16 in order to prevent verification problems which might have arisen if the SS-16 program had gone forward, since in that case distinguishing between SS-16 and SS-20 deployments would have been very difficult.

Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, the sides exchanged data on the numbers of weapons in SALT-limited categories, and agreed to maintain this agreed data base through regular updates at each session of the Standing Consultative Commission. Although the United States did not require (and did not rely upon) this data for verification purposes, maintenance of the agreed data base would have insured that both parties applied the provisions of the Treaty in a consistent manner.

The protocol to the Treaty was to have remained in force until December 31, 1981. In the protocol the sides agreed to ban deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and flight-testing of ICBMs from such launchers. Development of such systems short of flight-testing would have been permitted. (After the protocol period, the Treaty specifically permitted the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers.)

Additionally, the protocol banned deployment, but not testing, of cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers on ground- and sea-based launchers. (The protocol would not have limited deployment of such systems after its expiration in 1981.)

Finally, the protocol included a ban on flight testing and deployment of ASBMs.

The Joint Statement of Principles, the third element of the SALT II agreement, would have established a basic framework for the next stage of SALT negotiations, SALT III. The sides agreed on the following general goals to be achieved in the next round of talks:

    -- significant and substantial reductions in the number of strategic offensive arms -- further qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms and -- resolution of the issues included in the protocol.

The sides would also have considered other steps to enhance strategic stability, and either side could have brought up any other topic relevant to the limitation of strategic arms.

The Joint Statement of Principles also established the principle that cooperative measures might be used to ensure adequate verification of a SALT III agreement, raising the possibility of thus going beyond reliance on national technical means of verification alone.

Treaty Text

Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together With Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty*

Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament,

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty.

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

* The text of the SALT II Treaty and Protocol, as signed in Vienna, is accompanied by a set of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, also signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev, which is prefaced as follows:

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

As an aid to the reader, the texts of the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are beneath the articles of the Treaty or Protocol to which they pertain.

First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers," as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date.

2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.

Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965 and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type.

3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:

(b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above

(c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and

(d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.

    (a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types

First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers," as used in paragraph 3 of Article II and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty in this connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties further agree that:

(b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and

(c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs.

    (a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber

First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.

Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is, in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes.

Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner:

Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52 and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Tupolev-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear type and

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bison type.

4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.

5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon C-3 SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs.

Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first flight-tested of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs when first installed on a submarine and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with MIRVs when first flight-tested.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs correspond in the following manner:

-- Missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C-3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

-- Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

-- Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

    -- Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman III and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:

(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

    (a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems

Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty.

Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs on the basis of externally observable design features of the submarines.

This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of signature of the Treaty.

6. ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs.

First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable.

Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:

(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

    (a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems

7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX.

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.

2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.

3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI.

1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.

3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, whichever is later.

Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of these dimensions.

(b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers

(c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

    (a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements

Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements," as used in paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher.

6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.

Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity or more than 1,000 meters per second.

8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose.

Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single reentry vehicle this Common Understanding also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the reentry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the reentry vehicle of that missile.

9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.

First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs," as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects:

(b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.

    (a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile

First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent.

Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.

A Party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other Party of the date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last twelve of the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches before deployment begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than ten percent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those twelve launches.

Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date.

First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

    ICBMs of the Minuteman III type -- Seven reentry vehicles

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    ICBMs of the RS-16 type -- Four reentry vehicles

Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America have been deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles. During the term of the Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy missiles of this type with more than three reentry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979, the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes:

(b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and without an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flight-tested by that Party as of May 1, 1979 and

(c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and with an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than fifty percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM.

    (a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with reentry vehicles the weight of any of which is less than the weight of the lightest of those reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date

11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen.

First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

  • ICBMs of the Minuteman III type -- Seven reentry vehicles
  • SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type -- Fourteen reentry vehicles
  • SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type -- Seven reentry vehicles.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

  • ICBMs of the RS-16 type -- Four reentry vehicles
  • ICBMs of the RS-18 type -- Six reentry vehicles
  • ICBMs of the RS-20 type -- Ten reentry vehicles
  • SLBMs of the RSM-50 type -- Seven reentry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy bombers.

First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B-52 or B-1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for more than twenty cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320,455.

2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200.

3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, all bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

5. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

2. Those arms in the final stage of construction are:

3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows:

Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force.

4. ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such conversion has been performed.

5. A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. A bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.

Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission, shall include:

Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers from the aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be based upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training.

Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in Article VII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

First Agreed Statement. The term "significant increase," as used in subparagraph 2(a) of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of fifteen percent or more. Any new ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training launchers at test ranges will be located only at test ranges.

Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located: for the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that Party to test ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms, including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested.

Second Common Understanding. Of the eighteen launchers of fractional orbital missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, twelve launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization.

Dismantling or destruction of the twelve launchers shall begin upon entry into force of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. These twelve launchers shall not be replaced.

Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the Treaty. After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be removed and shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX and of Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, except in the case of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization. After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such conversion, any activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed. These six launchers shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if converted, to the provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty.

1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs no more than sixteen airplanes, including airplanes which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flight-test ASBMs from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flight-test ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty shall not apply to such airplanes. The aforementioned airplanes may include only:

The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement shall not be used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers after the expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

First Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing.

Third Common Understanding. None of the sixteen airplanes referred to in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced, except in the event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of the dismantling or destruction of any such airplane. The procedures for such replacement and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its conversion, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II.

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The launch-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of:

Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and (f) of Article IX of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.

Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following periods from that date: four months for ICBM launchers six months for SLBM launchers and three months for heavy bombers.

3. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated no later than January 1, 1981, shall be carried out throughout the ensuing twelve-month period, and shall be completed no later than December 31, 1981.

4. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time, but not later than six months after the entry into force of this Treaty.

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner.

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration.

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

First Agreed Statement. Deliberate concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. The obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures, provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defense penetration aids.

First Common Understanding. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions associated with testing. In this connection, the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

Second Common Understanding. Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. In addition to the obligations provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be used over ICBM silo launchers.

Article XVI 1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory.

First Common Understanding. ICBM launches to which the obligations provided for in Article XVI of the Treaty apply, include, among others, those ICBM launches for which advance notification is required pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971, and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed May 25, 1972. Nothing in Article XVI of the Treaty is intended to inhibit advance notification, on a voluntary basis, of any ICBM launches not subject to its provisions, the advance notification of which would enhance confidence between the Parties.

Second Common Understanding. A multiple ICBM launch conducted by a Party, as distinct from single ICBM launches referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty, is a launch which would result in two or more of its ICBMs being in flight at the same time.

Third Common Understanding. The test ranges referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty are those covered by the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty.

2. The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will:

3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979.

Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs fixed launchers of ICBMs launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs launchers of SLBMs launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs heavy bombers heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
JIMMY CARTER

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Protocol to the Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together With Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Protocol

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty,

Having agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs for such launchers.

1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers.

Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, respectively.

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
JIMMY CARTER

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Memorandum of Understanding Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have considered data on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of November 1, 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today.

U.S.A. USSR
Launchers of ICBMs 1,054 1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1,054 1,398
Launchers of ICBMs
equipped with MIRVs
550 576
Launchers of SLBMs 656 950
Launchers of SLBMs
equipped with MIRVs
496 128
Heavy bombers 574 156
Heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles capable
of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers
0 0
Heavy bombers
equipped only for ASBMs
0 0
ASBMs 0 0
ASBMs equipped
with MIRVs
0 0

At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed data in the categories listed in this Memorandum.

DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RALPH EARLE II

Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
V. KARPOV

Chief of the USSR Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The United States of America declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs 1,054
Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1,054
Launchers of ICBMs equipped
with MIRVs
550
Launchers of SLBMs 656
Launchers of SLBMs equipped
with MIRVs
496
Heavy bombers 573
Heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles
capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers
3
Heavy bombers equipped
only for ASBMs
0
ASBMs 0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 0

June 18, 1979
RALPH EARLE II
Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

I certify that this is a true copy of the document signed by Ambassador Ralph Earle II entitled "Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty" and given to Ambassador V. Karpov on June 18, 1979 in Vienna, Austria.

THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.
General Counsel
United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs 1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped
with MIRVs
608
Launchers of SLBMs 950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped
with MIRVs
144
Heavy bombers 156
Heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers
0
Heavy bombers equipped
only for ASBMs
0
ASBMs 0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 0

V. KARPOV
Chief of the USSR Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

W. D. Krimer,
Senior Language Officer,
Division of Language Services, U.S. Department of State

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

First. The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation.

In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.

Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties.

Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives:

Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary for the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

On June 16, 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement [original Russian text was attached]:

President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year.

President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.


Détente

During the 1960s, there was a noticeable easing of tensions between the United States, the Soviet Union and some of their allies. This decade-long thaw in international relations is known by various names. In the West it was called Détente, in Soviet Russia razryadka and in West Germany Ostpolitik. The period of Détente saw better communications and a greater level of respect between the nuclear superpowers.

What was Détente?

While Détente did not end the Cold War, it produced some significant achievements. The willingness of both superpowers to communicate led to arms reduction summits, the signing of anti-nuclear proliferation agreements and a reduction in nuclear arms stockpiles. There was political recognition of communist nations by the West, the most significant being Richard Nixon‘s 1972 visit to communist China.

Détente also brought about improved diplomacy and even some minor economic and trade agreements between East and West. Détente was a period of understanding and mutual acceptance by both Cold War superpowers. While their ideological and economic systems rendered them incompatible, both acknowledged the need for negotiation, compromise and working together.

There are different opinions about the nature of Cold War Détente. Some attribute Détente to a change of leadership. In the first decade of the Cold War, foreign policy had been defined by assertive ideologues like Joseph Stalin, Harry Truman and John Foster Dulles. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, these men were long gone. They had been replaced by political pragmatists like Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev.

Domestic crises

To some, Détente simply marked a normalisation in superpower relations. By the late 1960s, it had become impossible for US and Soviet leaders to maintain the hostility and belligerence they had maintained for a quarter-century.

Détente-era leaders had to wrestle with domestic issues as well as Cold War struggles. Economic changes and conditions rendered arms spending and direct confrontation costly, dangerous and unpopular. Governments had to find new, more sophisticated and subtle ways of waging the Cold War.

Raymond Garthoff supports this idea, suggesting that Détente represented a change in methodology, not a ‘winding down’ of the Cold War:

“The agreements [of Détente] cannot be said to have played any substantial role in affecting the course of the Cold War and its final settlement. They did not have any weakening effect on US or Western resolve or behaviour, as some critics had feared, nor can it be demonstrated that they moderated the pursuit of advantage … as both continued to wage the Cold War. Détente was a more sophisticated and less belligerent way of waging the Cold War, rather than an alternative to it.”

Causes of Détente

Some of the factors that contributed to the rise of Détente included:

Fears about nuclear weapons

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 triggered paranoia and public concern about the dangers of nuclear war.

Over time, nuclear powers came under international pressure to reduce stockpiles of nuclear warheads and missile systems. Pressure groups like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND, formed 1957) and Greenpeace (formed 1971) lobbied against the further production and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

American stockpiles of nuclear weapons peaked at more than 30,000 in the mid-1960s, then slowly declined. In July 1968, the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons while working towards nuclear disarmament.

Economic factors

The Cold War arms race was a costly business for the superpowers. Both spent billions of dollars and roubles on a myriad of Cold War-related activities, from weaponry to propaganda.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union faced additional, though contrasting economic problems during the 1970s. America spent billions of dollars on its involvement in Vietnam, while the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973 also led to disruptions in oil supply, higher fuel prices, a stock market slump and other detrimental effects on the US economy.

The Soviet economy, which had grown rapidly through the 1950s and 1960s, began to stall after 1970. Of particular concern was a lack of growth in the agricultural sector, which caused food prices to increase by between 50 and 100 per cent. Having to prop up several failing Soviet bloc states placed additional strains on the Russian economy.

New Zealanders protest against US nuclear warships in the Pacific

Domestic issues

During Détente, both major powers were distracted by internal problems that drew attention away from foreign policy.

In the US, domestic opposition to the Vietnam War and military casualties there limited the possibility of strong military action elsewhere in the world. America in the early 1970s was also distracted by the Watergate scandal, which ended in 1974 with the resignation of Richard Nixon.

The Soviet Union was preoccupied with economic problems, such as falling crop yields, internal opposition and problems within the Soviet bloc. Brezhnev dealt with opposition by winding back some of the liberal reforms implemented by Nikita Khrushchev, expanding the powers of the KGB and tightening press control and censorship.

The Sino-Soviet split

Through the 1960s, ideological differences and domestic political events caused the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China to drift apart. By 1967, Moscow and Beijing were barely on speaking terms.

Two years later, border clashes between Russian and Chinese soldiers threatened to plunge the two nuclear powers into a full-scale war. It was later revealed that Soviet Russia had developed more nuclear battle plans against China than against the United States.

American planners saw advantages in encouraging and widening the Sino-Soviet split. They did this through covert and diplomatic means, such as Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.

Ostpolitik

In West Germany, the 1969 election of Willy Brandt as chancellor heralded a new approach to the Cold War there. Brandt was more left-wing than previous West German leaders, though far from a communist. He favoured rapprochement, or the restoration of friendly relations, with East Germany and other Soviet bloc nations.

Brandt’s foreign policy, dubbed Ostpolitik (German for ‘eastern policy’), was a more practical and realistic attempt to bridge the Iron Curtain. The most important step, Brandt argued, was to permit and encourage trade deals with East Germany. He believed these new trade links would encourage greater communication and cultural exchange, making Soviet bloc nations less defensive and more open to reform.

Brandt’s Ostpolitik was very unpopular with conservatives, both in West Germany and internationally, however it was generally successful and played an important role in reducing European tensions. Ostpolitik also referred to a similar approach employed by Pope Paul VI and the Vatican, who sought greater communication with the leaders of Soviet bloc nations.

Nixon acknowledges China

The onset of Détente produced several international visits and bilateral conferences. In 1972, with the Vietnam War still raging, US president Richard Nixon visited communist China, where he met the ailing Chinese dictator Mao Zedong.

Nixon’s trip surprised the world and led to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing. Some thought the anti-communist Nixon had betrayed his own political values but most Americans were weary of the Vietnam War and supported improved relations with China.

Nixon’s visit also created nervousness in the Kremlin, which was not on good terms with China and feared the possibility of a US-China alliance. In May 1972, Nixon followed his visit to China with a state visit to Moscow. He conducted extensive meetings with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, signing trade agreements and two treaties to reduce arms manufacture. Nixon returned to the Soviet Union in 1974, while Brezhnev himself visited the United States in 1973.

Nuclear agreements

Détente yielded more advances during the 1970s. In August 1975, the US, USSR and 33 other nations signed the Helsinki Accords, a non-binding agreement aimed at enhancing relations between communist nations and the West.

There were also several Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s that produced two weapons-reduction agreements: SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979). Two multilateral treaties signed by the Americans and Soviets in 1972 outlawed biological weapons production and limited numbers of ballistic missiles.

In 1975, the Space Race came to an end with the launching of the Apollo-Soyuz project, the first joint American-Soviet space mission. The Soviet Union also increased its trade with the West, importing large amounts of American grain to offset the slump in its own agricultural production. Soviet imports of Western consumer goods also increased sharply, doubling by 1979.

A historian’s view:
“In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration claimed that the era ‘of confrontation’ with the Soviet Union was at an end and that the era ‘of negotiation’ was beginning. In 1981 the Reagan administration came to office, not with a commitment to negotiate with the Soviet Union but a promise to restore American strength and prestige. The 1970s were characterised by the incoming administration as a ‘decade of neglect’ in which the United States – seduced and blinded by Détente and hampered by Vietnam and Watergate – had failed to provide for its own security.”
Mike Bowker

1. Détente was a period of reduced hostility and improved relations between the superpowers. It began in the mid-1960s and continued into the 1970s.

2. There were several factors and conditions that led to Détente, including nuclear fears, domestic issues, changes to leadership and policy pragmatism.

3. Détente brought about better communication between the two superpowers. This led to several bilateral and multilateral treaties and Nixon’s 1972 visit to China.

4. Tensions also eased between Western-aligned and Soviet bloc nations in Europe. Of particular significance was the Ostpolitik policies of West Germany’s Willy Brandt.

5. Détente did not end the Cold War, which continued in proxy conflicts such as Vietnam – however, it did reduce the risk of a direct confrontation between the US and USSR.


SALT I

On January 20, 1969, the day of Richard M. Nixon's first inauguration, the Soviet government offered to hold negotiations on the issues of nuclear arms control. Nixon immediately accepted and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, commonly known as SALT, were arranged. They took place in two phases: SALT I ran from 1969 to 1972 and resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. SALT II, begun in late 1972, produced a treaty that was never ratified by the U.S. Senate. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan abandoned SALT and undertook the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks, commonly known as the START talks, instead. As the third decade of the atomic age began, the continued development of the technology of nuclear weapons and delivery systems led the United States and the Soviet Union to realize the futility of an unlimited arms race in those devices. In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that Soviet Premier Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin had agreed to meetings on the issue, but those talks never came about. When the Soviet Union reopened the matter in 1969, President Richard Nixon seized the opportunity, and the first meeting was held in Helsinki in November. With the help of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States negotiated the ABM Treaty and an interim agreement that essentially froze nuclear arsenals at their existing levels. Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on May 26, 1972, at a summit meeting in Moscow. The interim agreement, commonly called the SALT I Treaty, froze the total number of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, but allowed the replacement of old missiles with new ones. In the interests of achieving an actual reduction and preventing qualitative advances in destructive technology, the two nations began SALT II talks in November of the same year in Geneva. In a meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974, President Gerald Ford and Brezhnev agreed to a basic framework for a SALT II Treaty. However, international political considerations prevented the treaty from being completed until 1979. President Jimmy Carter sent the SALT II Treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent on June 22, 1979. Objections arose and the treaty had not been ratified when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, which chilled U.S. and Soviet relations. On January 3, 1980, Carter asked that the Senate delay further consideration of the treaty. The treaty was never ratified by the Senate, but was formally honored by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In May 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared that the United States would not violate the provisions of the treaty if the Soviets agreed to do the same. The Soviets did agree, although Reagan declared in 1984 and 1985 that the Soviet Union had violated that pledge. A new round of talks, called the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, replaced SALT beginning in 1983. The agreement would put a cap of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 "accountable" warheads for each country, while enabling them to continue modernizing their weaponry.


The outbreak of World War I leads to the formation of a new Albanian government backed by Serbia. After Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Serbia conquered Kosova and much of Albania from Austrian and German forces, as Albanian ruler Wilhelm zu Wied refused Austria-Hungary’s request that Albania join the war on the side of the Central Powers. Wied keeps Albania neutral, but leaves, without abdicating, in September when Austria-Hungary ends his remuneration. Therefore, the Serbs make former Albanian minister Esad Pasha Toptani the ruler of Albania. Following the revolt that spring, Esad lost his ministerial post for an alleged conspiracy and went to Italy and then the Serb capital at Nis. He makes a lone pact with Serb prime minister Nikola Pasic to create a pro-Serbia Albania. Their plan is to establish a customs union, joint military efforts, and joint diplomacy. Funds were given to Esad so influential Albanians could assemble to form an Albanian government, which would then give Serbia rights to create a rail link through Albania to the Adriatic. Allegedly Esad keeps the money for himself. [Kola, 2003, pp. 16-17]

A secret treaty is signed in London between the Entente—comprising Britain, France, and Russia—and Italy, giving Italy the port of Vlora, the nearby island of Sazan (Saseno), and whatever area Italy deems necessary to hold them. If Italy captures Trentin, Istria, Trieste, Dalmatia, and some islands in the Adriatic, France, Russia, and Britain’s plan to split Albania between Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia will go ahead. The border between Greece and Serbia would be west of Lake Ohri. Part of Albania would remain, but its foreign policy would be under Italy’s control. The four signatories are the same ambassadors who signed the treaty that created the Albanian state in 1913. The treaty will be made public by the Bolsheviks in 1917. [Vickers, 1998, pp. 89 Kola, 2003, pp. 17]


INF Treaty Signed

On December 8, 1986 Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Agreement at a summit in Washington. The treaty eliminated all Intermediate-Range Missiles from Europe.

The Soviets deployed SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe in 1977. The range of the missile was below the range that was included in SALT II, which was a range of 3,400. The German pressured the US to come up with a response. The US developed a plan to deploy a Pershing II missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.

In October 1980 negotiations began between the United States and the Soviet Union to find a way to limit the Intermediate-Range Missiles. Initial talks made little progress. In November 1981 President Reagan presented a zero option, the plan that neither side should have any intermediate missiles in Europe. The Soviets responded by suggesting a slow decrease in the number of rockets and planes both sides could have in Europe. The talks did not make very much progress.

In March 1986 negotiations resumed in earnest. On October 11, 1986, President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavík Iceland. At the summit, both sides agreed to remove INF missiles from Europe and limit the total number in the world to 100 on each side. The full text of an agreement was finalized in September 1987. On December 8 Reagan and Gorbachev signed the agreement at a summit in Washington. The US Senate ratified the treaty in May by 93-5. The INF treaty marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.


A Brief History of Salt

S alt comes from dead, dried-up seas or living ones. It can bubble to the surface as brine or crop out in the form of salt licks and shallow caverns. Below the skin of the earth it lies in white veins, some of them thousands of feet deep. It can be evaporated from salt “pans,” boiled down from brine, or mined, as it often is today, from shafts extending half a mile down.

The history of the world according to salt is simple: animals wore paths to salt licks men followed trails became roads, and settlements grew beside them. When the human menu shifted from salt-rich game to cereals, more salt was needed to supplement the diet. But the underground deposits were beyond reach, and the salt sprinkled over the surface was insufficient. Scarcity kept the mineral precious. As civilization spread, salt became one of the world’s principal trading commodities.

Salt routes crisscrossed the globe. One of the most traveled led from Morocco south across the Sahara to Timbuktu. Ships bearing salt from Egypt to Greece traversed the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Herodotus describes a caravan route that united the salt oases of the Libyan desert. Venice’s glittering wealth was attributable not so much to exotic spices as to commonplace salt, which Venetians exchanged in Constantinople for the spices of Asia. In 1295, when he first returned from Cathay, Marco Polo delighted the Doge with tales of the prodigious value of salt coins bearing the seal of the great Khan.

As early as the 6th century, in the sub-Sahara, Moorish merchants routinely traded salt ounce for ounce for gold. In Abyssinia, slabs of rock salt, called ‘amôlés, became coin of the realm. Each one was about ten inches long and two inches thick. Cakes of salt were also used as money in other areas of central Africa.

Not only did salt serve to flavor and preserve food, it made a good antiseptic, which is why the Roman word for these salubrious crystals (sal) is a first cousin to Salus, the goddess of health. Of all the roads that led to Rome, one of the busiest was the Via Salaria, the salt route, over which Roman soldiers marched and merchants drove oxcarts full of the precious crystals up the Tiber from the salt pans at Ostia. A soldier’s pay&mdashconsisting in part of salt&mdashcame to be known as solarium argentum, from which we derive the word salary. A soldier’s salary was cut if he “was not worth his salt,” a phrase that came into being because the Greeks and Romans often bought slaves with salt.

“With all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt,” says Leviticus 2:13. Because of its use as a preservative, salt became a token of permanence to the Jews of the Old Testament. Its use in Hebrew sacrifices as a meat purifier came to signify the eternal covenant between God and Israel. In one biblical case, salt symbolized a lack of fidelity. In Genesis 19:1-29, two angels of the Lord command Lot, his wife and two daughters to flee the sinful city of Sodom without ever looking back. When Lot’s wife cast a fleeting glance backward (her faith was uncertain), she was immediately transformed into a pillar of salt. A Roman religious ritual, however, in which grains of salt were placed on an eight-day-old babe’s lips, prefigures the Roman Catholic baptismal ceremony in which a morsel of salt is placed in the mouth of the child to ensure its allegorical purification. In the Christian catechism, salt is still a metaphor for the grace and wisdom of Christ. When Matthew says, “Ye are the salt of the earth/’ he is addressing the blessed, the worthy sheep in the flock, not the erring goats.

During the Middle Ages, the ancient sanctity of salt slid toward superstition. The spilling of salt was considered ominous, a portent of doom. (In Leonardo da Vinci’s painting The Last Supper, the scowling Judas is shown with an overturned saltcellar in front of him.) After spilling salt, the spiller had to cast a pinch of it over his left shoulder because the left side was thought to be sinister, a place where evil spirits tended to congregate.

The social symbolism of salt was painfully evident in the medieval equivalents of the Amy Vanderbilt Complete Book of Etiquette. As late as the 18th century, the rank of guests at a banquet was gauged by where they sat in relation to an often elaborate silver saltcellar on the table. The host and “distinguished” guests sat at the head of the table&mdash”above the salt.” People who sat below the salt, farthest from the host, were of little consequence.

Salt taxes variously solidified or helped dissolve the power of governments. For centuries the French people were forced to buy all their salt from royal depots. The gabelle, or salt tax, was so high during the reign of Louis XVI that it became a major grievance and eventually helped ignite the French Revolution. As late as 1930, in protest against the high British tax on salt in India, Mahatma Gandhi led a mass pilgrimage of his followers to the seaside to make then-own salt.

If the importance of a food to a society can be measured by the allusions to it in language and literature, then the significance of salt is virtually unrivaled. Nearly four pages of the Oxford English Dictionary are taken up by references to salt, more than any other food. “A grain of salt” may be a recipe for skepticism. But there can be no doubt about how salt has seasoned history.


SALT agreements signed - HISTORY

In talking about arms control during the Cold War, I will focus on the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Control aspect of it. This is of course by no means the whole picture it leaves out, among other things, the Nonproliferation Treaty. But the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship was what occupied our attention most of the time.

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Cold War was really about nuclear weapons. The nuclear age and the Cold War begin at roughly the same time. Nuclear weapons defined in important respects the Cold War relationship between the two main protagonists. It was nuclear weapons that made the Cold War different from the great political rivalries of the past. The nuclear dimension was rarely if ever lost sight of by leaders, and in publics it produced a pervasive nuclear anxiety, particularly at the beginning of the Cold War. Every U.S. president since the Cold War began felt compelled to try to find in some way ways to control nuclear weapons—even though most of them were at the same time also building up our nuclear arsenal.

If the results were modest until the very end of the Cold War, they were not without significance. In a sense, the impulse to control the new and terrifyingly destructive power of nuclear weapons preceded the weapons themselves. Well before the Trinity test, some of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project fretted about their larger responsibility to humanity. Niels Bohr among others lobbied to open early discussions with the Russians in order to establish postwar international control of nuclear weapons, an idea rapidly squelched by Winston Churchill. The idea of international control resurfaced in what might be called the first nuclear arms control proposal of the Cold War, the Baruch plan, which the U.S. put forward in 1946. The Baruch plan would have created a supranational body, the Atomic Development Agency, with a global monopoly over virtually the whole field of atomic energy and the right of intrusive inspection. But the Russians were even then hard at work on their own nuclear weapon and had not the slightest interest in giving it up, so the Baruch plan went nowhere.

Nearly a decade passed before the next serious effort at arms control, a decade that marked the height of the Cold War with all its crises and tensions, the Korean War and the Berlin blockade. The Soviets had by then acquired their own bomb, which added to the underlying nuclear anxiety. To the extent nuclear arms control was considered at all, it took the form of empty and propagandistic schemes for abolishing the bomb in the context of complete and general disarmament.

It was ironically the invention of thermonuclear weapons that provided the impulse for the first real arms control agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Public concerns about the fallout from testing, which were already acute, intensified with the spectacular tests of these vastly more destructive weapons, in particular the U.S. Bravo series. Public protests and pressures to end testing increased, but it took eight years, some very difficult negotiations, and the combined efforts of two U.S. presidents before a Soviet proposal for a standalone ban on testing, first put forward in 1955, became the landmark treaty of 1963, which banned all testing in the atmosphere, the oceans, and space.

President Eisenhower said that the deepest disappointment of his presidency was his inability to conclude this treaty, and it fell to JFK to finally do so. But this did not happen until we had gone, as the phrase goes, eyeball-to-eyeball with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It may indeed have been this sobering experience that pushed the two leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev, to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

In many ways the 1963 LTBT set the pattern for how arms control was to proceed during the Cold War. It was an important milestone, unquestionably. It showed that we and the Soviets could find common ground on nuclear issues, despite our larger political hostility. But it did nothing to slow the rapidly increasing numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides. Still less did it do anything to slow or constrain nuclear testing. Testing simply went underground. Fifty-four percent of all U.S. tests between 1945 and 1980 took place after 1963, and today the goal of abolishing all nuclear tests remains unrealized and controversial.

By then, of course, it was clear that nuclear weapons were here to stay. We came to regard them as a fearsome necessity designed to ward off not only a Soviet nuclear attack but also, more plausibly, a conventional attack by superior Warsaw Pact forces on NATO forces in Europe, to which the U.S. was committed, at a point purposely left vague, to respond with its nuclear weapons. It was our firmly held belief that nuclear weapons kept the peace by forestalling an otherwise inevitable conventional war in Europe. And indeed, if we look at the historical record of how great power rivalries have resolved themselves in the past, I’m not prepared even today to say that this was wrong.

Thus, nuclear weapons came in some sense to be regarded as a stabilizing factor. We lost any interest in abolishing them or even in the pretense that this would be a good thing. But the numbers continued to grow, and by the late 1960s the Soviets had built up their arsenals of ICBMs to levels approaching ours. People worried that if we did not stop the inexorable rise of Soviet weapons, they would soon outpace us.

Out of this concern were born the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which produced two agreements, SALT I and SALT II. Limitation was the operative word, because at that time there was really no thought of trying to agree on reductions. Our goal was to slow, and ultimately halt, the pace of increase.

The SALT I agreement, which was signed in 1972 during the Nixon administration, in fact included two agreements: the ABM Treaty and the “Interim Agreement.” Under the ABM Treaty, with the exception of two ABM sites allowed to each side, the U.S. and USSR renounced the idea of building nationwide defenses against nuclear attack.

The ABM Treaty has assumed iconic status to both its supporters and detractors as the embodiment of the strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and was elevated into a cornerstone of strategic stability. It was unquestionably a major achievement, but its origins were rather more mundane than later interpretations suggest. We had an antimissile system that wouldn’t work. that was hugely expensive, and which the Senate was refusing to fund. The Soviets, who did have an ABM system, were happy to close off an expensive technological race with the U.S. that they were sure to lose.

Unquestionably, mutual deterrence, and a condition of mutual vulnerability were the existential realities of the Cold War. At one level, this reality was probably accepted by both sides. In this sense, the ABM Treaty codified a fact of life rather than a choice of doctrine, particularly since the Soviets never really bought into MAD, at least in the sense it was understood by American strategists.

The second agreement, the Interim Agreement, froze ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at existing levels, limits that have been rightly characterized as “temporary, high, and incompletely agreed.” There were some serious omissions. The agreement failed to limit the growth of Soviet heavy missiles, a particular bugaboo of American strategic planners. More seriously for future stability, it did nothing to constrain the new technology of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This allowed a single missile to carry up to 8–10 warheads. Once MIRVs were introduced, first by us and then by the Soviets, the total numbers of weapons were to rise to really stratospheric levels. But the Interim Agreement said nothing about MIRVs.

Then too, the Interim Agreement froze the numbers at higher levels for the Soviets than the U.S., a fact that was more important because of political perceptions than it was militarily.

SALT I was nonetheless ratified, and new negotiations began immediately for a successor treaty. However, these were not completed until the very end of the Carter administration. SALT II was everything SALT I was not. It provided for equal levels between the two sides, heavy bombers were included, it dealt with such problems as heavy missiles and MIRVs, it was carefully and precisely drafted, a lawyer’s dream in many ways. The only problem was that it capped weapons at levels far above existing ones, so that the Soviets actually had the right to deploy an astonishing 1,200 additional weapons.

SALT II was greeted by a storm of criticism which ultimately reflected less its own inadequacies than a radical change that had occurred in the political climate in the seven years it took to negotiate it. By 1979, the Kissinger-Nixon d‚tente was discredited. It was felt that the Soviets were on the march throughout the globe, while we were in retreat in Vietnam and elsewhere. People worried about Soviet strategic superiority and something called the “window of vulnerability.” The final straw was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, after which President Carter withdrew the treaty from the Senate. That was in effect the end of arms control during the Cold War proper. There was to be a long hiatus before arms control negotiations got going again in earnest, and by that time, Gorbachev’s arrival on the scene signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

So what can we say about arms control during this period of the Cold War? Its achievements were modest it’s easier to say what it did not achieve than what it did. It did not end or even slow the arms race, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Numbers continued to rise. Neither side gave up a single weapon system that it really wanted. It did not reduce defense spending to the contrary, both SALT and I and SALT II were purchased at the price of a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget. It is sometimes claimed that it helped to stabilize relationships between the two superpowers, but this claim does not really withstand scrutiny. Arms control was a very fragile bloom, and it was blown off course by political winds on numerous occasions. Thus, Eisenhower’s hopes for signing the LTBT were dashed with the downing of the U2 and the cancellation of his summit with Khrushchev. LBJ had hoped to open the SALT negotiations in 1968, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia put an end to that. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan crushed SALT II. Moreover, the agreements themselves were often sources of bitter controversy.

But if we accept that it was unrealistic to think that arms control could transcend the political hostility of the broader relationship, we can see that its modest contribution was significant in its own way. First, the very fact of the dialogue between the two nuclear-armed superpowers was reassuring to publics and perhaps in some ways to the participants themselves. It helped, however minimally, to lessen the nuclear anxiety to which I have alluded. This nuclear anxiety certainly increased during periods when there was no arms control negotiation going on. The agreements themselves provided a modicum of transparency and predictability. Moreover, a decade of arms control negotiations created a small community of experts on either side who among themselves created the building blocks—the terms, the definitions, the “counting rules”—that were to provide the foundation for the later, more lasting agreements of the Reagan-Gorbachev era.

Finally, even though Ronald Reagan had sharply attacked the SALT II agreement during his 1980 presidential election campaign and was never to ratify it, his administration observed the treaty’s limits by mutual agreement with the Soviets until 1986.

And so we come to the final phase, the winding down of the Cold War, the Reagan-Bush-Gorbachev era. Even those of us who were not particular admirers of President Reagan will concede that he has emerged as a more complex figure than he seemed at the time. Among his more intriguing characteristics was his very genuine abhorrence of nuclear weapons. However, little during Reagan’s first term prefigured the nuclear abolitionist of the Reykjavik summit. To the contrary, the often bellicose rhetoric emanating from Washington, the suggestion that a nuclear war could be fought and won in Europe, the build-up of our nuclear arsenal were developments deeply unnerving to public opinion and inspired the creation of a nuclear freeze movement that brought out half a million people in Central Park in the early 1980s. There was not a single high-level meeting between the U.S. and Soviet leaders during this period.

If Reagan’s insistence that arms control must produce real reductions was not unreasonable, his fantastic vision of a missile shield that would render nuclear weapons obsolete, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was ably manipulated by the opponents of arms control in his administration into a permanent blocking device for any arms control agreement at all.

Gorbachev’s arrival on the scene changed this dynamic. It was not Ronald Reagan’s firmness, our outsized defense budgets, or the pressure of SDI that brought the Cold War to an end, but rather Gorbachev, who understood how counterproductive the Soviet military build-up of the 1970s- 80s had been—bankrupting the Russian economy, generating hostility in the outside world, and generally isolating Moscow. He now sought, in parallel with the domestic reforms known as perestroika, to give a new direction to Russia’s relations with the outside world and to reduce the weight of military expenditures on the Russian economy—among other things, through arms control agreements. In Reagan, he was surprisingly to find a supportive interlocutor.

And so, for a time, we find Gorbachev throwing out arms control proposals like a sparkler, for the abolition of this, deep reductions of that, and so on. This energy resulted, among other things, in the famous Reykjavik meeting of October 1986, where agreement was reached on a breath-taking series of proposals, including the elimination of all nuclear weapons, only to have everything fall apart at the end over SDI. Many people, including our European allies, were quite relieved.

In the end, only the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement survived the wreckage of Reykjavik. This treaty, which was signed in December 1987, eliminated an entire class of weapons, the intermediate-range nuclear weapons—on the U.S. side, the Pershings and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) that had been so recently deployed in Europe in the face of massive political opposition, and on the Russian side, the SS 20s.

But it was not until the George H.W. Bush administration that we succeeded in closing the deal on the far more important strategic weapons, the long-range missiles on either side. The START I Treaty was signed in 1991 and ratified three years later, thus beginning a ten-year process of reductions that resulted in the destruction of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. A second treaty, START II, was signed in the closing days of the G.H.W. Bush administration. In these two treaties, we achieved goals we had been pursuing for twenty years—including deep reductions, the elimination of heavy missiles, intrusive verification and the like.

But then something funny happened. In the early 1990s, the USSR ceased to exist, the Cold War was over, and we suddenly ceased to care very much about these things anymore. We no longer worried about the Soviet strategic threat the urgency was no longer there. START I was not ratified until three years after it was signed, in 1994 START II was never ratified at all. Real arms control, it seemed, became possible only when it was no longer necessary. But it would be wrong to argue, as some have, that these treaties were unnecessary or redundant because the Soviets would have reduced on their own, or to underestimate their importance because the Cold War had ended. The treaties provided a useful framework for the transformations taking place and an indispensable instrument for managing the end of the Cold War and the decline of Soviet power. They locked into place the reductions as well as transparency and verification mechanisms, and they remain very important.


Schengen States Territories that are not part of the Schengen

Apart from the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands, no other country that is located outside of the European continent is not part of the Schengen Area or has not signed the Schengen Agreement.

Accordingly, the following six integral parts of France located outside Europe: French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, and Collectivity of Saint Martin are members of the EU but are not of the Schengen Area, and therefore even the Schengen visa issued by France is not valid in these territories. Each of these territories has its own visa policies and regimes for nonmembers of the European Economic Area and non-nationals of Switzerland.

The following four territories are also other integral territories of France, located also outside of the European territories that are not members of the EU or Schengen Area: French Polynesia, French Southern, and Antarctic Lands, Caledonia, Saint, and Wallis and Futuna.

The following six territories are integral parts of the Netherland in the Caribbean: Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba (BES Islands) and Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten (independent countries of the Kingdom of Netherlands). None of these territories is part of the EU nor of the Schengen Area, and they have their own visa policy and regime.

The territory of Svalbard is an integral part of Norway that under International Law enjoys a special status but it is not part of the Schengen area. This territory does not imply any visa regime for entering there, yet any non-national cannot enter it without traveling through the Schengen Area.

The two following territories are an integral part of Denmark: the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Despite this, none of them is a member of the EU or of the Schengen Area. As a result, holders of Denmark visas cannot enter any of these two territories if they first do not get visas specifically from such countries. However, nationals of Nordic Passport Union member countries can enter these two territories only through Identification cards


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