We are searching data for your request:
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.
Francis Harry Hinsley, the son of Thomas Henry Hinsley and his wife, Emma Adey, was born in Walsall on 26th November, 1918. His father was a wagoner who drove a horse and cart between the local ironworks and the railway station. After attending the local elementary school he went to Queen Mary's Grammar School. (1)
In 1937 won a scholarship to St John's College, Cambridge, to read history. A talented student he found himself interviewed by Alastair Denniston, the head of of the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) in July 1939. During his interview Denniston went through his CV, noting that he was good at sifting through old documents such as the Domesday Book. Hinsley said the kind of questions they asked me were: "You've travelled a bit, we understand. You've done quite well in your Tripos. What do you think of government service? Would you rather have that than be conscripted? Does it appeal to you?" (2) Hinsley later discovered that his name had been suggested by his history tutor, Hugh Gatty. (3) Hinsley commented: "Denniston... recruited the wartime staff from the universities with visits there in 1937 and 1938 (also 1939 when he recruited me and 20 other undergraduates within two months of the outbreak of war)." (4)
In the summer of 1939 Hinsley spent his vacation in Nazi Germany. His girlfriend lived in Koblenz and because of the political situation, Hinsley was ordered to report to the local police station each day. On 23rd August Adolf Hitler signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The authorities now considered war more unlikely and the police told Hinsley that he no longer needed to visit the station every day and that they would get in touch with him if any problems came up. A week later, a German policeman advised the parents of his girlfriend, "Get him out of the country by tomorrow at the latest." Hinsley immediately left and was able to cross the French border before it closed. (5)
As arranged by Alastair Denniston, Hinsley reported to Bletchley Park on the outbreak of the Second World War, that took place a few days after arriving in England. His biographer, Richard Langhorne, has pointed out: "Congregated there was a group of young, highly accomplished men and women, living a completely secret life in conditions somewhat resembling a physically uncomfortable university senior common room." (6) At first Hinsley worked under Phoebe Senyard. She later described him as "a slight, bespectacled young man with wavy hair" with a outstanding intellect. She later recalled: "I can remember quite well showing Harry some of the sorting and how delighted he seemed when he began to recognise the different types of signals... If I was in difficulty, I knew I could go to Harry. It was a pleasure because he was always interested in everything and took great pains to find out what it was and why. Those were very enjoyable days indeed. we were all very happy and cheerful, working in close cooperation with each other." (7)
Francis Harry Hinsley was originally sent to Hut 3: "Hut 3 was set up like a miniature factory. At its centre was the Watch Room - in the middle a circular or horseshoe-shaped table, to one side a rectangular table. On the outer rim of the circular table sat the Watch, some half-dozen people. The man in charge, the head of the Watch or Number 1, sat in an obvious directing position at the top of the table. The watchkeepers were a mixture of civilians and serving officers, Army and RAF. At the rectangular table sat serving officers, Army and RAF, one or two of each. These were the Advisers. Behind the head of the Watch was a door communicating with a small room where the Duty Officer sat. Elsewhere in the Hut were one large room housing the Index and a number of small rooms for the various supporting parties, the back rooms. The processes to which the decrypts were submitted were, consecutively, emendation, translation, evaluation, commenting, and signal drafting. The first two were the responsibility of the Watch, the remainder of the appropriate Adviser." (8)
Frank Birch was head of the German section in Hut 4. He told Hinsley that they were trying to read intercepted German naval messages. "The code used by the Germans had not yet been broken. That being the case, Hinsley was to do his best to find out as much as he could from the information they did have about these messages. It was quickly apparent that there was not much evidence to go on. There was the date of the messages, their time of origin and their time of interception, and the radio frequency used by the German morse code operators. Sometimes Hinsley would be told where the messages came from, information which had been gleaned using the Royal Navy's direction finding service." Hinsley became involved with what became known as "traffic analysis". This was defined as "looking at all the evidence relating to enciphered messages which could not be read, and reaching a conclusion on what the enemy was doing." (9)
After Norway was invaded in April 1940, Hinsley was allowed direct contact with the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC). The following month Hinsley noticed that German naval messages were being sent on frequencies which had never been used before. Hinsley came to the conclusion that the Germans were about to move some of their ships from the Baltic Sea to the Skagerrak, the narrow stretch of sea separating Denmark and Norway. He passed on this information to OIC. However, they failed to notice the significance of this information. Unknown, to the British, the Germans had broken the Royal Navy's codes and they were using this information to track HMS Glorious, the aircraft carrier, on the way to Norway.
At about 5.30 p.m. on 8th June, the German battleship, Scharnhorst opened fire, "hitting Glorious with salvo after salvo of shells shot out of her 11-inch guns, until the British aircraft carrier was just a blazing inferno full of mutilated corpses". (10) The two escorting destroyers, were also sunk, leaving behind just three survivors. The total killed or missing was 1,207 from Glorious, 160 from Acasta and 152 from Ardent, a total of 1,519. (11)
Shortly after the sinking of Glorious, Hinsley was asked to go up to the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre in London, to explain how his traffic analysis worked. The meeting was attended by Rear Admiral Jock Clayton and Commander Norman Denning: "The OIC, which operated in the basement of the Citadel, had its own intelligence team, and Clayton wanted them to be well briefed, so that everyone could react quickly next time Hinsley rang them up. Clayton and Denning must have been surprised when Hinsley was ushered into their office. For standing before them was a man who was young enough to be one of Clayton's grandchildren. Hinsley was acutely aware that his long hair and casual clothing, which no one thought twice about in the laid back dons' common room atmosphere at Bletchley Park, was out of place beside all the spotless naval uniforms and suits worn at the Admiralty. Perhaps that was one reason why Hinsley found that his ideas did not receive a good reception from the junior officers he was supposed to be teaching. Another reason was that traffic analysis was not as easy as it sounded. Not everyone could cope with hours of searching through incomprehensible enciphered messages in the often vain hope of finding a ray of light hidden amongst the sea of paper. Hinsley on the other hand was well prepared for the job he had been given. His medieval history course at Cambridge had required him to look for the minuscule changes made to the charters he was analysing." (12)
Francis Harry Hinsley still had difficulty in communicating important information to the OIC. His colleague, Alec Dakin, wrote about this problem to Frank Birch was head of the German section in Hut 4. Dakin suggested that the military establishment was prejudiced against Hinsley's working-class background: "In their present state of ignorance, these people are not able to interpret and pass on any information they receive from Hinsley or the watch. That they should be jealous of his success is understandable, and that they should dislike him personally is a small matter, but that they should be obstructive is ruinous. (13)
Two days later Hinsley also wrote to Birch: "The only conclusion is that they not only duplicate our work and other people's work, but duplicate it in so aimless and inefficient a manner, that all their time is taken up in groping at the truth, and putting as much of it as is obvious to all on card indexes. If they duplicated in the right spirit, and with some purpose, they would be able to answer questions properly, and also possibly to contribute to general advancement... One reason that prevented them from doing this, appeared to be a competitive spirit, which instead of being of a healthy type, is obviously personal and couched itself in a show of independence and an air of obstruction. It appeared to be based on personal opposition to Bletchley Park. It was increased by the fact that the presence of one person from BP appeared to them to remove all their raison d'etre. They felt themselves cut out... Apart from the above, I suspect that another reason for their inadequacy is incapacity, pure and simple. They know facts... But they seem to have no general grasp of these facts in association. They lack imagination. They cannot utilise the knowledge they so busily compile." (14)
According to his biographer, Richard Langhorne, the OIC eventually began taking his advice: "His powers as an interpreter of decrypts were unrivalled and were based on an ability to sense that something unusual was afoot from the tiniest clues. Hinsley became the leading expert on the decryption and analysis of German wireless traffic, and, particularly after the capture of German Enigma code machines and materials, which allowed their settings to be broken, played a vital role in supplying the Admiralty with crucial intelligence analysis derived from Admiral Doenitz's signals." (15) His work was vitally important in the Battle of Atlantic. As a result of the work done at Bletchley Park, nearly a hundred U-boats were sunk in the first five months of 1943. On 23rd May, after hearing of the loss of the forty-seventh U-boat that month, Karl Dönitz ordered the wolf packs to be withdrawn from the Atlantic. (16)
At the end of the Second World War, Hinsley returned to St John's College, Cambridge, where he taught history. He also published Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1963) and Sovereignty (1966). In 1969 he was appointed as professor of the history of international relations in 1969. "He was a great teacher, an important writer, and a notably competent administrator. Countless generations of undergraduate historians at Cambridge remembered the extraordinarily vivid way in which he taught them, but the research school in the history of international relations that he established in the 1960s and 1970s was one of his greatest achievements." (17)
Frederick Winterbotham, who had worked at Government Code and Cypher School during the war, approached the government and asked for permission to reveal the secrets of the work done at Bletchley Park. The intelligence services reluctantly agreed and Winterbotham's book, The Ultra Secret, was published in 1974. Permission was now given to Francis Harry Hinsley, to publish his five volume British Intelligence in the Second World War (1979-1990). He also published Codebreakers: the Inside Story of Bletchley Park (1993), which served to add the flesh and blood excluded from the official account.
One of his students later recalled: "Hinsley was a strikingly rich character, almost a phenomenon of nature, in contrast to his bespectacled and physically slight appearance.... For many of his students, it was Hinsley's analytical skill so honed at Bletchley Park that affected them most. Whether in private - and always unstinting - discussion or at the famous weekly seminar he ran for all interested parties at every level, from behind a thick pall of pipe smoke, he reacted to the wider implications of what had been discovered or reassessed; and he would comment rapidly, almost electrically, on the true significance of what he had just heard or read. He never forgot any student he had taught or been tutor to, and his students never forgot their exposure to how he thought about things and the often striking language he used to describe what he thought." (18)
Sir Francis Harry Hinsley died of lung cancer at Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge, on 16th February 1998.
By 1937 it was established that... the German Army, the German Navy and probably the Air Force, together with other state organizations like the railways and the SS used, for all except their tactical communications, different versions of the same cypher system - the Enigma machine which had been put on the market in the 1920s but which the Germans had rendered more secure by progressive modifications.
Harry Hinsley had arrived at Bletchley in late 1939 and was immediately put in Phoebe Senyard's care. Unlike many of the dons, he did not have a privileged background. Hinsley was a grammar school boy from Walsall, in the Black Country. A slight, bespectacled young man with wavy hair, who had won a scholarship to St John's College, Cambridge, he was an immediate hit with Senyard.
The Security Officer on the gate used his telephone and summoned up a WAAF officer. She led me across a noble lawn, with on the left a Tudorbethan mansion, on the right a large lake; in front a small office. (It should be noted that the hut numbers not only designated the huts themselves but were also used as cover-names for the work going on in them. When, towards the end of the war, the Hut 3 work was transferred to a brick building, it was still called Hut 3.)
In my initiation stress was laid on the value of work going out from Hut 3. It was "the heart of the matter" and of immense importance. The Enigma had been mastered. The process up to the production of raw decrypts was carried out in Hut 6 next door. It was the task of Hut 3 to evaluate them and put the intelligence they contained into a form suitable for passing to the competent authorities, be they Ministries or Commands.
Frank Birch was head of the German section in Hut 4. The code used by the Germans had not yet been broken. Sometimes Hinsley would be told where the messages came from, information which had been gleaned using the Royal Navy's direction finding service.
Using all of the available information, Hinsley worked out that the German Navy only had two radio networks: one for the Baltic and one for outside the Baltic. There did not appear to be a separate network for surface ships and a different network for U-boats. Hinsley could only hope that would change once the Germans began conducting major naval operations. For the moment, he was stuck in a dead end job with no opportunity to make his mark.
I can remember quite well showing Harry some of the sorting and how delighted he seemed when he began to recognise the different types of signals. He joined up with Miss Bostock working on frequencies and callsigns. I then had to pass to Harry any strange, new or unknown signals. We were all very happy and cheerful, working in close cooperation with each other.
It remained a loose collection of groups rather than forming a single, tidy organisation... Professors, lecturers and undergraduates, chessmasters and experts from the principal museums, barristers and antiquarian booksellers, some of them in uniform and some civilians on the books of the Foreign Office or the Service ministries - such for the most part were the individuals who inaugurated and manned the various cells which sprang up within or alongside the original sections. They contributed by their variety and individuality to the lack of uniformity. There is also no doubt that they thrived on it, as they did on the absence at GC&CS of any emphasis on rank or insistence on hierarchy.
Hut 3 was set up like a miniature factory. Elsewhere in the Hut were one large room housing the Index and a number of small rooms for the various supporting parties, the back rooms.
The processes to which the decrypts were submitted were, consecutively, emendation, translation, evaluation, commenting, and signal drafting. The first two were the responsibility of the Watch, the remainder of the appropriate Adviser.
Shortly after the sinking of Glorious, Hinsley was asked to go up to the Citadel in London, the building in the Mall where the OIC was situated, to explain how his traffic analysis worked. The OIC, which operated in the basement of the Citadel, had its own intelligence team, and Clayton wanted them to be well briefed, so that everyone could react quickly next time Hinsley rang them up. Perhaps that was one reason why Hinsley found that his ideas did not receive a good reception from the junior officers he was supposed to be teaching.
Another reason was that traffic analysis was not as easy as it sounded. His medieval history course at Cambridge had required him to look for the minuscule changes made to the charters he was analysing. His upbringing also helped. He had been brought up to make the most of the little which was available to him. Money had always been in short supply when he was young. His father was an occasional labourer, who spent most of the 1930s out of work. His mother worked as a cleaner, providing just enough to keep the Hinsley family clothed and fed. He was proud of the fact that when he went to Germany in 1939, he managed to survive on a meagre budget of just £5 for the entire summer.
ID8G, its relations with us and its attitude to our staff. Here the prime test is Hinsley and his dope; practically we stand or fall with him. I believe that anyone who reads one or two of Hinsley's best Y serials, (especially the Glorious one, of course), and bears in mind that A.C.N.S. has been letting him send signals to the fleets, must conclude that there is something in it, that Hinsley's linkages do give him "indications" of future activity, which examination of the bulk of the traffic do not give. But ID8G, not least the day and night watchkeepers, who are the people concerned, seem never to have studied a Y... and if one discusses the validity of the linkage approach with them one has to start at the very first principle, and say that a non-linked message may be dummy, or weather, or "I have anchored because of fog", or even 'The captain's wife has had twins', whereas a linked message is pretty certain to mean something. In their present state of ignorance, these people are not able to interpret and pass on any information they receive from Hinsley or the watch. That they should be jealous of his success is understandable, and that they should dislike him personally is a small matter, but that they should be obstructive is ruinous.
The only conclusion is that they not only duplicate our work and other people's work, but duplicate it in so aimless and inefficient a manner, that all their time is taken up in groping at the truth, and putting as much of it as is obvious to all on card indexes. They cannot utilise the knowledge they so busily compile.
(1) Richard Langhorne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)
(2) Sinclair McKay, The Secret Life of Bletchley Park (2010) page 23
(3) Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle For The Code (2004) pages 53-54
(4) Francis Harry Hinsley, quoted by Robin Denniston, the author of Thirty Secret Years (2007) page 24
(5) Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle For The Code (2004) page 53
(6) Richard Langhorne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)
(7) Phoebe Senyard, quoted by Michael Smith, the author of Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park (1998) page 55
(8) Francis Harry Hinsley, quoted by Michael Paterson, the author of Voices of the Codebreakers (2007) page 55
(9) Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle For The Code (2004) pages 55 and 138
(10) Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle For The Code (2004) page 140
(11) John Winton, Carrier Glorious: The Life and Death of an Aircraft Carrier (1999) page 200
(12) Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle For The Code (2004) page 139
(13) Alec Dakin, letter to Frank Birch (21st October 1940)
(14) Francis Harry Hinsley, letter to Frank Birch (23rd October 1940)
(15) Richard Langhorne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)
(16) Michael Smith, Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park (1998) page 117
(17) Richard Langhorne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)
Hinsley, Francis Harry, 1918-1998
This steady rise up the academic ladder was rudely interrupted by the onset of the Second World War in Europe. When the war broke out, he had taken a First Class in Part I of the Cambridge Historical Tripos but had not completed a first degree and was never to do so. During the summer vacation of 1939 Hinsley made a typical student’s trip to Europe and particularly Germany. He saved resources by hitch hiking and liked to recall how he had succeeded in getting a lift up to Berchtesgaden in an official limousine. There he found himself in a small crowd and in touching distance of Hitler as he emerged to leave. At the last possible moment, even a little beyond it, he returned to England safely by train and went back to Cambridge for his second year. There he discovered that his intellect had attracted the attention of two Cambridge dons, Martin Charlesworth of St John’s and F. E. Adcock of King’s. They had been asked to find suitably able candidates for the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park and Hinsley was enlisted to the unit. There he joined the Naval Section and worked for the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre.
Congregated at Bletchley was a group of young, highly accomplished men and women, living a completely secret life in conditions somewhat resembling a physically uncomfortable University Senior Common Room. ‘It was a lovely life’, he later recalled. ‘Bletchley Park was like a University. We lived the anarchic lives of students. There was a tremendous social life, parties, amateur dramatics, lots of young ladies and lots of young men.’ Young as he was, Hinsley became the leading expert on the decryption and analysis of German wireless traffic. Hinsley’s interpretative skills became highly significant after May 1941, when, acting on his instinct that German trawlers stationed off Iceland were carrying Enigma code machines, the OIC arranged to capture one. Together with cryptanalytical material secured from the U-boat 110 and a second trawler captured in June 1941, the information gained enabled Bletchley Park to read the German naval enigma traffic. This achievement played a vital role in supplying the Admiralty with crucial intelligence analysis derived from Admiral Doenitz’s signals – information which helped to win the battle against U-boats in the Atlantic. ‘I knew Doenitz best of all’, he later said. ‘He ran the U-boats like a prep school. There was a time when I could tell you whether Doenitz was personally on duty. I could tell from the way he planned it. He was good. Mind you, he had a fairly rigid mind.’ Hinsley’s powers as an interpreter of decrypts was unrivalled and was based on an ability to sense that something unusual was afoot from the tiniest clues. He was not always believed, particularly in early days. His warning, for example, that something was happening in the Baltic just before the German invasion of Norway went unheeded. He knew the British naval mind, too. Young as he was, his insights came to be respected – they called him the Cardinal – and he made several extended visits to Admiral Tovey’s flagship at Scapa Flow, on one occasion organising an attempt to bring the German battleship Tirpitz within range, which only narrowly failed. His description of his role in the sinking of the Bismarck was later to become a famous Hinslaic set piece once it became possible to deliver it.
The secrecy of Bletchley Park was scrupulously observed both during the war and for thirty years after it. The result was an inevitable lack of assessment of the role of intelligence in the streams of books recounting the history of the war. Only after 1979, with the publication of the first of his five monumental volumes on the history of British Intelligence in the Second World War, was it possible for Hinsley to discuss the significance of what he and others had achieved during the war at Bletchley Park. He said that the long period of enforced silence was made easier because he could at least discuss it with his wife, Hilary Brett Brett-Smith (the daughter of Herbert Francis Brett Brett-Smith), whom he married on 6 April 1946, and who had been there too. The official history dealt with both successes and failures, such as Montgomery’s decision to ignore warnings about Hitler’s intention to hold the Scheldt which led to the Arnhem debacle, and set out to be dispassionate in every way. It was thought to be heavy going and dry, but Hinsley, who had wrestled with every kind of sensitivity during the writing of the histories – internal and those of foreign governments – simply responded that ‘it was meant to be bloodless’. Sir Maurice Oldfield, former Director-General of M16, complained that it was ‘remarkable in that there are hardly any names in it. You get the impression that the intelligence war was won by committees in Whitehall.’ When all was over, however, he supplied a highly entertaining version, edited with Alan Stripp, of Bletchley Park memoirs under the title Code-breakers: The inside story of Bletchley Park (1993) which served to add the flesh and blood excluded from the official account. Perhaps most interesting of all was Hinsley’s personal assessment of the ultimate result of the intelligence effort. It had not been a ‘war winner’ but was a ‘war-shortener’. He thought that the war might have been as much as two years longer without it, certainly one year. ‘Without it’, he often said, ‘Rommel would have got to Alexandria. The U-boats would not have done us in. But they would have got us into serious shortages and put another year on the war.’
The desperately important and occasionally highly dramatic contribution to the British Second World War intelligence effort that was made by the specially recruited group of scholars at Bletchley Park has been well documented in recent years. Harry Hinsley’s significant role within that remarkable effort has also been very widely acknowledged since it became possible to discuss it at all. His achievement in bringing the official histories to completion should not be underestimated. He demonstrated qualities of persistence and patience which triumphed over what at times were serious efforts to persuade him to abandon the project altogether. He could occasionally be testy with those who failed to comprehend the hard realities in any situation – a fairly common occurrence in academic life, but that never affected the way in which he conducted business or thought about intellectual problems. It might be guessed that it was the results of both his historical output and his patience that eventually led to the offer of a knighthood which he felt he could accept.
1. Donal J. Sexton, Signals intelligence in World War II: a research guide (Westport, CT, 1996). Since 1996, see Michael Smith, Station X: the codebreakers of Bletchley Park (London, 1998). David Syrett (ed.), The Battle of the Atlantic and Signals Intelligence: U-boats and trends, 1941-1945 (Aldershot, 1998). David Alvarez (ed.), Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II (London, 1999). See also the novel Enigma by Robert Harris (London, 1995).
Francis Harry Hinsley 1918–1998
Sir Harry Hinsley was a cryptanalyst, an historian and an effective university administrator. He was fascinated by the progression of peace and war since states had become the most common form of political organisation among human societies, and their near universality had induced the creation of an international system among them. Here are to be found the main thrusts of his three core books: Power and the Pursuit of Peace (CUP, 1963), Sovereignty (Watts, 1966), and Nationalism and the International System. Of these, Power and the Pursuit of Peace is the most substantial, Sovereignty the most important and original of his writings, while Nationalism represents a further working out of a very important theme from Power and the Pursuit of Peace.
British Academy Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
Bletchley Park [ edit ]
At Bletchley Park, Hinsley studied the external characteristics of intercepted German messages, a process sometimes termed "traffic analysis": from call signs, frequencies, times of interception and so forth, he was able to deduce a great deal of information about the structure of Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine ' s communication networks, and even about the structure of the German navy itself. Δ]
Hinsley helped initiate a programme of seizing Enigma machines and keys from German weather ships, such as the Lauenburg, thereby facilitating Bletchley Park's resumption of interrupted breaking of German Naval Enigma. He realised that, as the ships were on station for long periods, they would have to carry the code books (which changed every month) for subsequent months these would likely be in a locked safe, and might be overlooked when the crew threw Enigma materials (including the code book currently in use) overboard if the ship was boarded, an assumption which proved correct. Ε]
In late 1943, Hinsley was sent to liaise with the US Navy in Washington, with the result that an agreement was reached in January 1944 to co-operate in exchanging results on Japanese Naval signals. Ζ]
Towards the end of the war, Hinsley, by then a key aide to Bletchley Park chief Edward Travis, was part of a committee which argued for a post-war intelligence agency that would combine both signals intelligence and human intelligence in a single organisation. In the event, the opposite occurred, with GC&CS becoming GCHQ. Η]
On 6 April 1946, Hinsley married Hilary Brett-Smith, a graduate from Somerville College, Oxford, who had also worked at Bletchley Park, in Hut 8. ΐ] They moved to Cambridge after the war where Hinsley had been elected a Fellow at St. John's College. Ώ]
Hinsley was awarded the OBE in 1946, and was knighted in 1985. ΐ]
On his death, Sir Harry Hinsley was cremated, and his family buried the ashes privately in Cambridge.
- ^ abc"Obituary: Professor Sir Harry Hinsley" . The Independent. 19 February 1998 . Retrieved 9 April 2018 .
- ^ abcd Langhorne, 2004
- ^Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh (2004) . Enigma: The Battle for the Code (Cassell Military Paperbacks ed.). London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-84251-4 .
- ^ Kahn, 1991, p. 120
- ^ Sisman, Adam (2019). The Professor and the Parson: A Story of Desire, Deceit and Defrocking . Profile Books. p.㻠. ISBN 978-1-78283-530-1 .
- ^ Kahn, 1991, p. 121
- ^ Dr. Mark Baldwin, "The Enigma Machine", presentation to the BCS Tayside & Fife Branch, Abertay University, 26 August 2019
- ^ Michael Smith, "How the British Broke Japan's Codes", p. 148 in Action this Day, edited by Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith, 2001
- ^ Michael Smith, prefatory remarks to Richard J. Aldrich, "Cold War Codebreaking and Beyond: The Legacy of Bletchley Park", p. 403 in Action this Day, edited by Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith, 2001
- ^"Vice-Chancellor's Office" .
- ^ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
- ^Marian Rejewski, "Remarks on Appendix 1 to British Intelligence in the Second World War by F. H. Hinsley," translated by Christopher Kasparek, Cryptologia, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 75–83.
- ^Gordon Welchman, "From Polish Bomba to British Bombe: the Birth of Ultra," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 1, no. 1, 1986, pp. 71–110.
- ^Hinsley, F.H. Stripp, Alan, eds. (1993) , Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-280132-6
- ^"Distinguished Lecture Series - St John's College, Cambridge" .
Hinsley History, Family Crest & Coats of Arms
The name Hinsley has a long Anglo-Saxon heritage. The name comes from when a family lived at Hindley, in Lancashire, or later at Hiendley, in the West Riding of Yorkshire. Both place names are essentially are derived from the Old English words "hind," which meant "female deer," and "leah," which meant "forest clearing." The place-names as a whole mean "forest clearing where hinds are found." 
Of the two locals, Hiendley or South Hiendley is the oldest as it dates back to the Domesday Book of 1086 when it was known as Hindeleia.  Hindley in Manchester dates back to 1212 when it was known as Hindele. 
Set of 4 Coffee Mugs and Keychains
Early Origins of the Hinsley family
The surname Hinsley was first found in Lancashire, now part of Greater Manchester.
"The family of Hindley, then Hindele, held lands here as early as the reign of Henry II.: in the eighth of Richard II., Robert, of this family, married Emma, one of the heiresses of Pemberton and the Hindleys were living at the Hall in 1613." 
Early rolls included Simon de Hindelay in the Assize Rolls of Yorkshire in 1219 and Robert de Hindeley in the Assize Rolls for Durham in 1243. 
The Yorkshire Poll Tax Rolls of 1379 included Margareta de Hyndelay Roger de Hyndelay and Matilda de Hyndelay. 
Coat of Arms and Surname History Package
Early History of the Hinsley family
This web page shows only a small excerpt of our Hinsley research. Another 78 words (6 lines of text) covering the years 1591, 1613, 1700 and 1701 are included under the topic Early Hinsley History in all our PDF Extended History products and printed products wherever possible.
Unisex Coat of Arms Hooded Sweatshirt
Hinsley Spelling Variations
Spelling variations in names were a common occurrence before English spelling was standardized a few hundred years ago. In the Middle Ages, even the literate spelled their names differently as the English language incorporated elements of French, Latin, and other European languages. Many variations of the name Hinsley have been found, including Hindley, Hindeley, Hindle, Hyndley and others.
Early Notables of the Hinsley family (pre 1700)
Another 37 words (3 lines of text) are included under the topic Early Hinsley Notables in all our PDF Extended History products and printed products wherever possible.
Hinsley migration +
Some of the first settlers of this family name were:
Hinsley Settlers in United States in the 19th Century
Hinsley migration to New Zealand +
Emigration to New Zealand followed in the footsteps of the European explorers, such as Captain Cook (1769-70): first came sealers, whalers, missionaries, and traders. By 1838, the British New Zealand Company had begun buying land from the Maori tribes, and selling it to settlers, and, after the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, many British families set out on the arduous six month journey from Britain to Aotearoa to start a new life. Early immigrants include:
Power and the Pursuit of Peace
2 Diese Artikel unterliegen nicht der Preisbindung, die Preisbindung dieser Artikel wurde aufgehoben oder der Preis wurde vom Verlag gesenkt. Die jeweils zutreffende Alternative wird Ihnen auf der Artikelseite dargestellt. Angaben zu Preissenkungen beziehen sich auf den vorherigen Preis.
3 Durch Öffnen der Leseprobe willigen Sie ein, dass Daten an den Anbieter der Leseprobe übermittelt werden.
4 Der gebundene Preis dieses Artikels wird nach Ablauf des auf der Artikelseite dargestellten Datums vom Verlag angehoben.
5 Der Preisvergleich bezieht sich auf die unverbindliche Preisempfehlung (UVP) des Herstellers.
6 Der gebundene Preis dieses Artikels wurde vom Verlag gesenkt. Angaben zu Preissenkungen beziehen sich auf den vorherigen Preis.
7 Die Preisbindung dieses Artikels wurde aufgehoben. Angaben zu Preissenkungen beziehen sich auf den vorherigen Preis.
8 Ihr Gutschein TASCHE gilt bis einschließlich 30.06.2021 und nur für die Kategorie tolino Zubehör. Der Gutschein kann mehrmals eingelöst werden. Sie können den Gutschein ausschließlich online einlösen unter www.eBook.de. Der Gutschein ist nicht mit anderen Gutscheinen und Geschenkkarten kombinierbar. Eine Barauszahlung ist nicht möglich. Ein Weiterverkauf und der Handel des Gutscheincodes sind nicht gestattet.
* Alle Preise verstehen sich inkl. der gesetzlichen MwSt. Informationen über den Versand und anfallende Versandkosten finden Sie hier
World War II
Hinsley, F.H., E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations . 5 vols. London: HMSO. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1991.
For Pforzheimer , Hinsley's magnum opus is "arguably the most comprehensive officially authorized publication ever produced on intelligence." The focus "is largely on strategic intelligence." The authors "had access to virtually all available strategic, and many operational, British intelligence documents. including the Ultra material." Petersen characterizes the volumes as "a massive and masterful official history heavily weighted toward Ultra that does not provide the names of individuals." To Sexton , the work is an "indispensable source."
Vol. 1: 1939 - Summer 1941 . 1979.
Vol. 2: Mid 1941 - Mid 1943 . 1981.
Vol. 3, Part 1: June 1943 - June 1944 . 1984.
Foot , I&NS 2.1, calls this volume of Hinsley's series "extremely detailed [and] meticulously accurate. it is a heavyweight, experts' assessment in readable Whitehallese of the impact of intelligence data, mostly from decipher, on strategy and on major operations, outside the far east."
Vol. 3, Part 2: Hinsley, F.H., with E.E. Thomas, C.A.G. Simkins, and C.F.G. Ransom. Summer 1944 to the End of the War with Germany . 1988.
In the opinion of Erskine , IJI&C 6.2, "Hinsley makes too few judgments, and his book is definitely not bedside reading. Order of battle appreciations loom all too large in the colorless descriptions of the land fighting, which are the weakest feature of the book. The series as a whole is a superlative work of scholarship, and will not be surpassed for a long time. The Hinsley volumes . are indispensable for all serious students of intelligence or of World War II."
Usherwood , History Today , Oct. 1989, comments that the "excellence of the thirteen pull-out maps, thirty appendices, footnotes and index add to the fascination of this unique book."
Vol. 4: Hinsley, F.H., and C.A.G. Simkins. Security and Counter-Intelligence . 1990.
Clark comment : This thematic volume focuses primarily on MI5 and Section V of MI6/SIS.
For Usherwood , History Today , Aug. 1990, the book covers "in fascinating detail the true story of the secret warfare waged by MI5 and SIS against their German counterparts."
In comments expressing unhappiness about the policy that limits references to individuals, Cecil , I&NS 6.1, notes that the authors supply "plenty of information about enemy agents, but almost nothing about those who so skilfully manipulated them." Because of the disparity in available records, "the organization and structure of MI5 come over much more clearly" than those of Section V. There is also "much more about MI5's relationship with the FBI than . about that of Section V with the OSS this is disappointing."
Vol. 5: Howard, Michael E. Strategic Deception . 1991.
Clark comment : Strategic Deception is the official version of the "bodyguard of lies." The work covers Cascade, Mincemeat, and Fortitude. It is doubtful that more will ever be said broadly about World War II strategic deception than we have here, although additional details may trickle in over time.
Surveillant 2.1 calls this an "impeccably researched official publication." For Richardson , New Statesman & Society , 24 Aug. 1990, "Howard's history is both assured and elegant, but it really takes wings when he deals with his exotic cast of agents," including "Garbo," "Tricycle," and "Gleam."
Bennett , I&NS 6.1, expresses considerable dismay with what he views "in certain respects" as "a transparently inadequate, even a positively misleading, version of events." He finds that there are "many omissions," "incomplete explanations," and an "absence of essential references." The reviewer laments that "[w]e remain as ignorant as before about a crucial element in the success of Overlord -- how the Allied superiority in intelligence . was harnessed to Fortitude in order to keep enough German divisions away from the Normandy beachhead for long enough to facilitate the landings." Nonetheless, the work "is written with such authority that it . is likely to remain the last official word on its subject for the foreseeable future."
2. One-volume edition of official history
Hinsley, F.H. British Intelligence in the Second World War . Abridged version. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. London: HMSO, 1993.
Clark comment : The authors of the official history of British intelligence in World War II have performed an enormous service for the nonspecialist reader by producing this abridged, one-volume edition. The writing is not spritely, but there is no better starting point for anyone interested in the British perspective of the role of intelligence in World War II.
According to Surveillant 3.2/3, this version "has retained the operational and strategic material vital to our understanding of the role played by intelligence in the formulation of allied policy and the conduct of allied operations. [It] will be indispensable to historians. Omitted is the technical and administrative material and the scholarly apparatus of the original volumes."
McGinnis , Cryptolog 15.2, suggests that the work "would make an excellent text for military intelligence courses because the manner in which intelligence is used is timeless. The author attempts to estimate how COMINT resulted in shortening WWII. The estimate is at least one year, and probably more. This is an excellent book, one recommended for serious study."
For Handel , I&NS 10.2, the abridged version is "more readable. The reader interested in more details on specific battles or episodes should of course refer to the earlier volumes. [T]he book might . have benefitted from an overall summary of the role of British intelligence in the Second World War. Although not without flaws, including a disappointing number of typographical errors. [this] is a most useful addition."
Kruh , Cryptologia 18.1, says the abridged version is "a worthy alternative" to the multivolume series, and it includes "much of the important intelligence and cryptologic aspects of the originals." This work "is essential for a full understanding of the role of British intelligence in the war and its influence on strategy and operations."
3. Other writings on World War II intelligence by F.H. Hinsley
Hinsley, F.H. "British Intelligence in the Second World War: An Overview." Cryptologia 16, no. 1 (1990): 1-10.
This is a sweeping, all-too-brief summary of the role of British communications intelligence in World War II.
1. "The Counterfactual History of No Ultra." Cryptologia 20, no. 4 (Oct. 1996): 308-324.
Speech at the University of Cambridge Computing Laboratory Security Seminar, 19 October 1993, with text of follow-on question-and-answer session.
2. "The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War." Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2004): 103-113.
Remarks and answers to questions by Hinsley on 19 October 1993, at "Babbage Lecture Theatre, Computer Laboratory."
Hinsley, F.H. "Cracking the Ciphers." Electronics and Power: The Journal of the Institute of Electrical Engineers 33 (Jul. 1987): 463-465.
To Sexton , this is an "informative discussion of the breaking of high-level German on-line ciphers (codenamed FISH) by COLOSSUS in World War II."
Hinsley, F.H. "The Enigma of ULTRA." History Today 43, no. 9 (Sep. 1993): 15-20.
Adapted from Hinsley and Stripp, eds., Codebreakers , this is an excellent brief look at Hinsley's view of the importance of the Ultra material to the war effort.
British intelligence in the Second World War / by F.H. Hinsley - volumes 1-3
Hinsley, F. H. (Francis Harry) (1918-1998)
Published by London : H.M.S.O, 1979
First Edition. Fine cloth copies in equally fine, unchipped dust wrappers, now mylar-sleeved. Particularly well-preserved overall tight, bright, clean and strong. Series: History of the Second Wold War. Physical description: Volumes 1-3. Subjects: World War, 1939-1945 - Secret service - Great Britain. Intelligence - service - Great Britain. 1 Kg.
Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park
Essential, serious, reading for any intelligent modern-day visitor to Bletchley Park this book describes not only how German, Italian and Japanese codes were broken and read by the Allies during WWII, but also, most fascinatingly, how the workforce was garnered and organised.
This is not a ‘popular’ light read. However it will appeal to those who are seeking the depth of more specialist technical detail that is omitted from so-called “accessible” books on the subject.
Any 16-17 year-old consideri Essential, serious, reading for any intelligent modern-day visitor to Bletchley Park this book describes not only how German, Italian and Japanese codes were broken and read by the Allies during WWII, but also, most fascinatingly, how the workforce was garnered and organised.
This is not a ‘popular’ light read. However it will appeal to those who are seeking the depth of more specialist technical detail that is omitted from so-called “accessible” books on the subject.
Any 16-17 year-old considering reading languages at university will find fresh perspectives to challenge their thinking.
I thought this book to be remarkably well written I could almost smell the oil on the bombes! It left me wondering what working at GCHQ today might really be like and how dependent we are today on close, strong, relationships with our Allies.
I&aposve been reading this book for several weeks and still haven&apost finished it yet, but I figured I&aposd go ahead and review it now because the book is pretty technical and I probably won&apost get through it for another 3 months. I&aposm cheating a bit, but I don&apost think my review will change much between now and the end.
The book is basically a series of short first person memoirs about cryptanalysis and the Ultra intelligence work from various Huts in Bletchley Park during WWII. I picked it up because I was I've been reading this book for several weeks and still haven't finished it yet, but I figured I'd go ahead and review it now because the book is pretty technical and I probably won't get through it for another 3 months. I'm cheating a bit, but I don't think my review will change much between now and the end.
The book is basically a series of short first person memoirs about cryptanalysis and the Ultra intelligence work from various Huts in Bletchley Park during WWII. I picked it up because I was interested in reading a non-fiction account of codebreaking and the use of intelligence during the war. It's really fascinating, although I have to confess that it's over my head in a lot of ways.
Some of the more interesting and readable elements are small personal recollections of the narrators (as opposed to technical descriptions of the inner workings of the Huts and the creation/use of Ultra intelligence), such as the recollections of the narrator who first reviewed the transmission that Adolf Hitler was dead and that Germany had appointed a new Fuhrer. I was also fascinated by one narrator's description of the level of secrecy apparently required of Bletchley Park employees even after the war ended. It makes sense in retrospect, but it's hard to imagine that people who were so integral to the intelligence community during the war were sometimes subjected to scorn because they could not disclose that they had been involved in intelligence work and, therefore, were unable to explain -- even to their spouses -- why they seemingly had not been involved in the war effort until many decades later.
However, apart from these types of anecdotes, the book should come with a warning that if you are not a WWII historian, you will not understand 85% of what the narrators are describing. Each memoir is littered with acronyms and German language words that require repeated consultation with the glossary at the beginning of the book. Moreover, every memoir presumes intimate knowledge of the names and locations of battles, generals, ships, etc. that are taken for granted by the narrators, but which are almost entirely unfamiliar to someone not born until 30+ years after the war ended. For example, a number of the chapters make reference to "Alamein" and how the Allies' ability to read Germany's encrypted messages helped win the battle. Before I could understand these chapters, I first needed to go read an encyclopedia to learn that there were two decisive battles near a city in north Africa, Alamein, in which the Allied troops defeated Rommel. This is essentially the reason it will take me another 3 months to finish this book -- every time I read a chapter, I need to consult other source material to put everything in context. . more
A collection of essays and memories of some of the people who worked in Bletchley Park on breaking German and Japanese codes during World War II. Overall it was very interesting, but it&aposs important to keep in mind that the book is rather a collection of isolated texts written by different people rather than an overview of the whole situation. Also, most of texts seem to be intended for readers, who are already familiar with what was going on (and maybe even readers, who are already familiar with A collection of essays and memories of some of the people who worked in Bletchley Park on breaking German and Japanese codes during World War II. Overall it was very interesting, but it's important to keep in mind that the book is rather a collection of isolated texts written by different people rather than an overview of the whole situation. Also, most of texts seem to be intended for readers, who are already familiar with what was going on (and maybe even readers, who are already familiar with the technical details). In the end, I've found the parts about the operations more interesting than the parts about the ciphers.
If you are interested in the lives of the people of Bletchley Park, this is a book to read. If you're looking rather for an introduction to the codes using during WW2 and the ways to break them, you should probably look elsewhere. . more
Imagine being called in for a job interview of which the coordinator will tell you nothing about beforehand. After being asked to analyze objects and answer a series of questions, you are dismissed. Once you are told you have the job, you must swear an oath to tell no one about it. Ever. As you arrive where you will spend the majority of the next few years your life, you find ominous barb-wire defenses surrounding dreary hut-like buildings. This would seem to alter the mood of the men and women Imagine being called in for a job interview of which the coordinator will tell you nothing about beforehand. After being asked to analyze objects and answer a series of questions, you are dismissed. Once you are told you have the job, you must swear an oath to tell no one about it. Ever. As you arrive where you will spend the majority of the next few years your life, you find ominous barb-wire defenses surrounding dreary hut-like buildings. This would seem to alter the mood of the men and women working for Ultra during WWII, but it didn’t, because of the overwhelming desire of the populace to contribute to the war effort. In Hinsley and Stripp’s book Codebreakers you read memoir after memoir describing the everyday life of the men and women--usually being referred to as Wrens--working for Ultra who helped gain the upper hand over the Germans via decryption ultimately turning the tides of WWII in the Allies’ favor.
From the Introduction to this book, the reader learns that Ultra was top secret during the war as well as for a long time thereafter. The influence of Ultra, according the authors, brings with it controversy concerning its influence on the war. Until the 1970s Ultra was hidden from the public and was kept a closely guarded secret by everyone involved. No one knew of its existence. Therefore historians, when compiling events and memoirs of WWII before the 1970s, did not take into account Ultra’s contributions to the victory of the Allies. Once the secret was released to the public and the historians, the new question came to mind: What exactly were Ultra’s contributions and how do historians incorporate this into the history books? They now have to detach Ultra from accounts of WWII and thus calculate how the war would have gone without that influence. This is what the authors deem so controversial. It would require counter-factual history, which in itself is an extremely difficult task. It is nearly impossible to predict what the enemies would have done had intelligence not known beforehand via decryptions. If the reader and historians do not try to analyze this then the significance of Ultra will never be fully known.
All chapters in Codebreakers, except for the intro, are Ultra workers’ recollections of their respective time spent there and the tasks they were assigned. The chapters themselves are split into five parts, each of them demonstrating the importance of the authors’ argument. Part one is devoted entirely to the production and intelligence of Ultra. Ultra, which was located in Bletchley Park, contained a facility divided into temporary ‘huts’ until later moving to more permanent buildings with different names. Each hut had a specific task pertaining to their expertise in warfare, for example: Air Force and Navy. Hut 3 was devoted to German Army and Air Force translation and processing. Hut 4 was for German Navy translating and processing. Hut 6 was in charge of German Army and Air Force Enigma cryptanalysis. Hut 8 was thus in charge of German Navy Enigma cryptanalysis. As Hut 6 decrypted ciphers they sent their work to Hut 3 who--through a series of people--translated and processed according to importance. The same goes for Hut 6 and Hut 4.
Part two and three of Codebreakers was devoted to the Enigma. These parts extensively cover a vast array of things like: how the devices made by the Germans evolved over time, how they were made, how they worked, how one would go about deciphering them, etc. Part Four is all about the mechanics of codes and ciphers, how they were ciphered, their interception by Ultra and their process of deducing which key to use, and how one used that to translate. Part Five was centered entirely on Japanese Codes. The Japanese attack, as the Maurice Wiles states, “found Britain ill-prepared in many ways, not least in people proficient in the language.” Therefore, they had to bring genius students in and the few people who knew the language had to teach them crash courses in Japanese. Japanese being a very hard language to learn, proved difficult since there are words that can have several unrelated meanings and one word can even mean a very specific phrase or description of an action. Hugh Denham, for example, says one word means “trying out a new sword on a passer-by” and another meaning “rolling up one’s sleeves and grinding one’s teeth in chagrin.”
Hinsley and Stripp’s book compiles memoirs of American and British civilians, scholars, teachers, and soldiers both men and women, all having different points of view to contribute to the overall portrayal of Ultra. This book is an excellent example of the phrase “short and sweet.” It is very concise and to-the-point while astonishingly giving you different perspectives and opinions of varying real life Ultra personnel. The introduction forces you to fully understand the weight of trying to counter history and what it entails. It does this by point out the difficulty it takes to do so, and the consequences of how you perceive the history you are countering. The proceeding parts and chapters seamlessly fall together. Instead of just flat out telling the reader about Ultra and what it was like to be a part of it the authors pieced together primary sources and lets you find out for yourself, being laid out in such a way and providing a glossary, effortlessly. It was a delight to see Bletchley Park through other’s eyes and learning how each individual became a part of it. It was even more so when at the end of every memoir the Ultra worker provides a memorable moment or cipher they had read of the enemies’. A goose bump worthy example being when Jewish Walter Eytan said, “we intercepted a signal from a small German commissioned vessel…reporting that it was transporting Jews… for the ‘final solution’. I instinctively knew what it must mean and I have never forgotten.” Through these endings to their memoirs you understand why, stated above, the men and women were determined to help the war effort so much so that they voluntarily sacrificed years, sleepless days, and their blissful ignorance (like Eytan) to the cause. These men and women did not get to claim any form of recognition. Hinsley and Tripp not only provide the reader with ample insight into the impact of Ultra, but also spur appreciation and admiration for the hard years of sacrifices these men and women made. . more